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Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA):
Differential Treatment for Developing Members and Its Impact on China
Zhong Linyan
China University of Political Science and Law, CHN
Abstract: There are many clauses of differential treatment for developing members in WTO agreements. On this basis, TFA adopts new forms of differential treatment. The TFA Section II (Articles 13 to 22) sets out the special and differential treatment enjoyed by developing and least developed members, and the special arrangement for this differential treatment is that it divides the trade facilitation measures in Section I into category A commitments, category B commitments and category C commitments, giving developing members corresponding differential treatment when implementing trade facilitation measures, and providing them with technical assistance and capacity building support based on their capacity; besides, the differential treatment is pre-set in legislation. In 2001, China joined WTO as a developing member. With the rapid development of China’s economy after the accession to WTO, China’s current identity in WTO is controversial. In the mean time, China’s implementation of TFA also faces many challenges. China always insists on the identity of developing countries in international communication. In WTO, China has also persevered in the self-positioning as developing members. Although China has assumed many obligations in TFA, it has also brought great opportunities for China.
Keywords: Trade facilitation; Differential treatment; Developing members; Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)
I. Introduction
All members of the WTO signed and adopted the TFA Protocol on December 27, 2014. This Protocol, which has been incorporated into Annex 1A “Multilateral Agreements Regarding Trade in Goods” of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, together with GATT 1994 and other agreements supporting trade in goods, is given legal status as a multilateral agreement on trade in goods. [1] In accordance with Annex D of the Doha Round Framework Agreement, the issues for negotiations on trade facilitation mainly include the following three points: (i) further clarification and improvement of Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 1994 to expedite the release and customs clearance of goods; (ii) special and differential treatment for developing and least developed members; and (iii) support for technical assistance and capacity building.[2] TFA has made corresponding provisions on three aspects involved in the abovementioned trade facilitation negotiations, including three parts: Section I prescribes the trade facilitation obligations assumed by each member, mainly with regard to trade facilitation measures; Section II prescribes the special and differential treatment enjoyed by developing and least developed members; and Section III prescribes the institutional arrangements and final provisions. [3]
II. The differential treatment in TFA and its innovations
Developing members, including “developing members” and “least developed members”, are an important part of the WTO, accounting for the majority of the total number of WTO members. [4] Section II of TFA sets out the special and differential treatment enjoyed by developing and least developed members, the innovations of which lie in that it divides the trade facilitation measures in Section I into category A commitments, category B commitments and category C commitments, giving developing members corresponding differential treatment when implementing trade facilitation measures, and providing them with technical assistance and capacity building support based on their capacity; besides, the differential treatment is pre-set in legislation. The differential treatment arrangement for developing members is the highlight of TFA, which plays an important role in the adoption and implementation of TFA.
(I) Main problems faced by TFA legislation
TFA faced three basic contradictions in legislation, namely, the contradiction between management and facilitation, the contradiction between fundamental institutional arrangement and backward infrastructure, and the contradiction of interest gambling between developing and developed members.
First of all, TFA puts forward higher requirements for members’ trade management ability in the process of promoting global trade facilitation, which leads to the contradiction between facilitation and trade management ability. A series of difficulties existing in developing members, such as lack of trade management experience, low level of professional competence of staff and imperfect management systems, have caused serious corruption, which have seriously resulting in low trade management efficiency of developing members.[5] This has given rise to particularly prominent contradiction between the requirements for facilitation and lack of management competence among developing members.
Secondly, the fundamental institutional arrangement of TFA requires that members should modernize their trade infrastructure, for example, requiring members to improve their information management systems, make trade-related policies and regulations transparent and adopt electronic documents, resulting in the fact that most members are unable to meet the requirements of the fundamental institutional arrangement of TFA by reason of backward trade infrastructure.[6] Developing members, on the one hand, because of the large scale of investment needed for infrastructure projects, and on the other hand because of the low level of economic development and inadequate financial strength, are unable to afford investment in trade infrastructure projects in the short term. This makes the contradiction particularly sharp between the fundamental institutional arrangement of TFA and the backward infrastructure of developing members.
Finally, from an overall perspective, trade facilitation saves trade costs and brings about an increase in economic benefits. However, due to the differences in the level of development and economic structure of the members, the economic benefits brought about by trade facilitation are unevenly distributed among them. In addition, the implementation of trade facilitation needs a lot of pre-investment, which is called the cost of trade facilitation. Therefore, although according to the WTO member survey, trade facilitation is a high priority for the economies of both developed and developing members,[7] there are great differences between developing members and developed members in the distribution of benefits and the cost bearing of trade facilitation. Consequently, in the process of TFA legislation, fierce conflicts of interests exist between developing members and developed members.
(II) Limitations of differential treatment before TFA
Before the entry into force of TFA, the differential treatment has been criticized by developing members for its vague wording, lack of operability and compulsion. Typically, in Part IV of GATT 1947, there is a significant requirement that developed members shall implement provisions “to the maximum extent possible”, which relies on the “voluntary efforts” of members to take action. Those provisions which are similar to “to the maximum extent possible” do not impose legal obligations on developed members because of a need in the interest of the developed members, and therefore do not give legally enforceable effect to the provisions offering developing members preferential and non-reciprocal treatment, hence with no binding effect.[8] At the same time, the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences), as one of the core systems of differential treatment, is not legally mandatory and is not an obligation to be fulfilled. Its implementation has arbitrariness and discrimination, especially in the selection of the beneficiary countries.[9] While the enabling clauses provide a legal basis for the principle of differential and preferential treatment for developing members, they are still of certain arbitrariness, as they do not specify the obligations to be fulfilled by developed contracting parties and how they should be enabled and negotiated solely between developed and developing parties. The enabling clauses do not create new and legally binding obligations for developed contracting parties: it merely makes the market access of preferential and non-reciprocal treatment possible , leaving the extent and level of preference to developed contracting parties.
The package agreements of the Uruguay Round concluded after the establishment of the WTO contain the differential treatment clauses for developing members in the wording of “best efforts”. For instance, in order to enhance the participation of developing members in World Trade, as stipulated in Article 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, developed members shall make best efforts to provide assistance in the aspects of technology and opening of markets. It is this language, which is not legally enforceable, that significantly diminishes the practical utility of differential treatment for developing members. This is why, in the context of international trade dispute settlement practices, when it comes to the validity of the differential treatment clauses for developing country members in the Agreement, the Panel has made it clear that “the clauses relating to differential treatment for developing country members do not impose precise legal obligations on the parties, and it is therefore difficult to determine under what circumstances developed country members have violated the said clause”.[10] As noted by Professor John Jackson, a renowned expert on international trade, most of the differential treatment clauses granted to developing members in the international trading system are “form over substance”; or of a nature of endeavor and expectation that makes it difficult to impose obligations on developed members; or the procedures of which are too cumbersome to invoke and use.[11]
In addition, the principle of MFN (Most Favored Nation) treatment is in conflict with that of developed countries because they always regard differential treatment for developing countries as an exception to the WTO. Based on this judgment, since the Uruguay Round, developing members have been deprived of the option of using many trade rules and replaced by a “transitional period”. The transitional periods are often set on subjective assumptions by developed members, while developing members, who know best their own capacity to perform, have no say in setting deadlines. Developing members can only decide whether to accept a package agreement within a specified period of time. Many “transitional periods” are not long enough for developing members to reach the capacity to fulfill their obligations.
(III) Significance of differential treatment in TFA
Based on the above analysis, due to the limitations of the actual situation of the members, there are a series of contradictions in the process of TFA legislation. Therefore, in order to achieve the successful adoption of TFA and the subsequent successful implementation, TFA has taken a series of measures to alleviate or solve the contradictions, such as the differential treatment for developing members. The provisions of Section II of TFA relating to differential treatment for developing members not only have adopted, for the first time, the policy whereby developing members may choose different categories of commitments at their own discretion in light of the relevant actual conditions of their own countries, but also are different from the previous provisions whereby developed members arbitrarily establish an obligation grace period. In terms of capacity building support, efforts will also be made to align the commitments made by developing members with aid provided by developed members and to promote the legally enforceable effect of the aid.
In the short run, the policies on differential treatment for developing members in TFA can effectively alleviate the contradictions, promote the enthusiasm and cooperation will of developing members, and create conditions for the legislation of TFA. In the medium and long term, the differential treatment policy for developing members in TFA can create conditions for the final resolution of contradictions encountered in the legislative process, help to strengthen the practical feasibility of the commitments of developing members, promote the successful implementation of TFA among all members, especially developing members, and truly achieve its goal of promoting global trade facilitation and international trade development. The new differential treatment model in TFA has opened up new paths and measures for the whole WTO system, and will certainly provide a good model for the future WTO negotiations and legislation.[12]
(IV) Major innovations of the differential treatment in TFA
Special and differential treatment is a preferential treatment enjoyed by developing members in the multilateral trading system and is the result of the long struggle of developing members with the development of the GATT. From the early GATT agreements to the post-WTO era, developing members are constantly seeking for their own more say in the international arena.[13] At present, there are many provisions of differential treatment for developing members in the WTO agreements.[14] The differential treatment policy in TFA continues the main changes in WTO and has been further developed on this basis. There are three main characteristics and innovations of the policy: firstly, the first part of the trade facilitation measures are divided into category A, B and C commitments, which developing members can choose according to their actual situation; secondly, developing members can obtain corresponding technical assistance and capacity building support according to their own capacity to help them implement trade facilitation measures; thirdly, TFA has incorporated the basic principle of differential treatment for developing members into the process of the formulation of the agreement at the beginning of the legislation, which itself forms part of TFA.
Developing members have long complained that they have not benefited in practice from the special and differential treatment clauses which are not specifically implemented by the WTO. These facts make the developed members such as the United States and the European Union, as well as the developing members at the same time feel dissatisfied. For developed members, they can provide technical assistance on the premise that developing members meet the required conditions. For developing members, nor did they want special and differential treatment just to be a matter of paper provisions, but rather for developed members to be able to give them real aid or preferential treatment.[15] Although some scholars are skeptical about the regulations and actual implementation of differential treatment in TFA, and think that the content and form of TFA are more important than the substance,[16] the differential treatment arrangement for developing members in TFA has solved the problem of technical assistance and capacity building of less developed members, and solved the problem of legislative and political will of developing and developed members in TFA. In the context of the multilateral trading system, without the differential treatment arrangements for developing members in TFA, it would not address the issue of capacities required for trade facilitation in developing members, nor would it lead to the eventual completion of TFA. The particularity of TFA differential treatment arrangement is the necessary requirement of TFA legislation, the indispensable condition of TFA universal implementation, and the important development of the WTO multilateral trade system.[17]
III. Impact of TFA on China
The 2015 World Trade Report, issued by the WTO, analyses the benefits and challenges of the implementation of TFA, noting that trade costs are high, especially in developing members. Full implementation of TFA would reduce the cost of global trade by an average of 14.3 per cent, with developing members benefiting most from the rapid and full implementation of TFA, as their exports and GDP growth would be higher than that of developed members. The implementation of TFA would create significant export diversification gains for developing members, especially the least developed ones, and would increase the opportunities for developing members to participate in global value chains.[18] China’s participation in TFA has its own particularity. As a developing member, China has taken on many obligations in TFA, but at the same time, TFA also brings great opportunities for China’s development.
(I) Obligations assumed by China participating in TFA
The trade facilitation measures provided in Section I of TFA are divided into category A, B and C commitments, and the members may determine the category of commitments at their discretion in light of their actual conditions. Category A commitments refer to those that a developing member is obliged to implement once TFA takes effect and that a least developed member may implement within one year after TFA takes effect. Category B commitments are those that can be implemented in a transitional period after the entry into force of TFA for both developing and least developed members. Category C commitments are those that, for both developing and least developed members, can undergo a transitional period after TFA enters into force, and that will not be implemented until capacity for implementation is obtained through capacity building technical assistance.
On June 30, 2014, China submitted category A commitments to the WTO Preparatory Committee for Trade Facilitation. According to the corresponding provisions of TFA and in line with China’s own situation, China has classified all the provisions in Section I of TFA as category A commitments with the exception of the following circumstances: (1) determination and publication of average release time in paragraph 6 of Article 7; (2) single window in paragraph 4 of Article 10; (3) goods temporarily permitted for import, entry and exit for processing in paragraph 9 of Article 10; and (4) customs cooperation in Article 12.[19] The trade facilitation measures in Section I of TFA mainly include three topics: transparency and predictability, simplification of customs procedures and customs cooperation. According to the Notification of Category A Commitments delivered by China, other than the above four reserved clauses, all the clauses are China’s category A commitments and once determined cannot be changed arbitrarily. TFA has taken effect and as a developing member China must comply.
At the outset, China did not identify the aforementioned four reserved clauses which are category B commitments and which are category C commitments. Members of the WTO may, as provided in TFA, apply to the Committee for a conversion from a category B commitment to a category C commitment. Paragraph 3 of Article 16 of TFA provides a fallback provision that, for clauses in respect of which no choice of commitment has been made, members may submit an application to the Committee depending on its ability to enforce the determination of the period for implementation, which gives further flexibility as to the period for the enforcement of the reserved clause. On June 6, 2017, China submitted the Notification of Category B Commitments.[20] The Notification states that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 16 of TFA, China sets four reserved clauses in its Notification of Category A Commitments as category B commitments, among which, the estimated and determined date of implementation for Paragraph 9 of Article 10 is November 2016, and the estimated date of implementation for Paragraph 6 of Article 7, Paragraph 4 of Article 10, and Article 12 is February 22, 2020, the determined date of implementation of which has not yet been confirmed.
That is to say, China currently has to undertake obligations specified in category B commitments, i.e. obligations relating to goods temporarily permitted for import, entry and exit for processing in paragraph 9 of Article 10, as well as all category A commitments in TFA, i.e. obligations relating to transparency and some simplification of customs procedures, including import and export fees and formalities, and freedom of transit system. The transparency obligations that China needs to undertake under TFA come from Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Section I of TFA which arise from the relevant contents of Article X of GATT 1994, namely, the issue of promulgation and implementation of trade regulations and the issue of transparency. These five articles define the transparency obligations to which members are subject in the course of trade in goods. China’s obligations to simplify customs procedures are correspondingly stipulated in Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of TFA, among which, Articles 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are clarification of Article VIII of GATT 1994, i.e. import and export fees and formalities, and Article 11 is clarification of Article V of GATT 1994, i.e. freedom of transit system.
(II) Challenges for China when implementing TFA
China has been striving to promote trade facilitation. China’s participation in TFA is very special. On the one hand, there is still a big difference in the level of trade facilitation between China and the developed members, but China bears many obligations in the WTO and makes contributions similar to the developed countries. As mentioned above, China has submitted the category A and B commitments, and category A commitments, once identified, become part of TFA and cannot be changed at will. China must undertake all category A commitment obligations. Meanwhile, China is also required to undertake the obligations specified in paragraph 9 of Article 10 in terms of the temporary import, entry and exit processing of goods, and is expected to implement the other three category B commitments on February 22, 2020. Thus, China now needs to implement most of the trade facilitation obligations in Section I of TFA.
In addition, China also provides assistance to other members in capacity building, which is a special feature of China. Although China is a developing member, it has long been implementing many foreign capacity building assistance policies and plans, such as those under the regional cooperation mechanism and in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has taken corresponding obligations to support the least developed members in the WTO, one of which is the China LDCs & Accessions Programme, which aims to provide resources for interns from the least developed countries to undertake some work in the Secretariat of the WTO concerning that member’s accession to the WTO, and provide an opportunity for officials of least developed countries to participate in meetings held in Geneva and to organize a round table conference on accession issues. At the same time, China contributed 411,300 Swiss francs twice in 2009 and 2010, respectively, to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund which was established to finance the implementation of the annual technical assistance plan.[21] China, as a developing member, has undertaken part of the obligations to provide technical support and capacity building assistance to the least developed members, which further increases the cost of implementing TFA in China.
On the other hand, China undertakes the obligations of developing members under TFA, but due to many shortcomings in customs trade facilitation, for example, customs administration fails to meet the facilitation requirements, and there is still a certain gap between infrastructure construction and infrastructure institutional arrangements. Therefore, China is unable to meet the requirements of TFA on trade facilitation measures, facing challenges concerning the implementation of TFA. Although after China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, China amended its Foreign Trade Law, formulated a multilateral trade remedy system that complies with the WTO rules and systems, established an inspection and quarantine system for import and export goods, and formulated a corresponding system for customs administration and trade facilitation, there are still some shortcomings in the customs trade facilitation: (1) The port institutions are subject to multi-level management and lack of coordination; (2) The construction of customs administrative supervision and single window is insufficient; (3) The level of customs trade facilitation among regions is unbalanced; and (4) The customs and trade laws and regulations need to be improved and the transparency needs to be enhanced.[22] In order to meet the requirements of TFA for trade facilitation, China needs to further improve the customs management capacity and infrastructure construction, enhance transparency and information disclosure, simplify customs procedures, promote cooperation among agencies, and improve the legal institutional arrangements relating to trade facilitation.
(III) Coping strategy for China
China’s economy has made great progress in recent years, but compared with the developed members, there is still a big gap. China’s customs management has not fully met the requirements of TFA, and a certain gap exists between the infrastructure construction and the basic institutional arrangements in TFA. China has submitted the notification of category A and B commitments, and category A commitments could not be changed at will, but members could apply to the Committee for a conversion of category B and category C commitments, thus giving developing and least developed members the corresponding right to choose the period of implementation and to have access to capacity building assistance and support. At the same time, it is provided for the first time in TFA that access to assistance and support depends on the capacity of developing and least developed members, and that the ability of developing and least developed members to fulfill their obligations under TFA is of crucial relevance. The fourth paragraph in the Preamble of TFA states that there is a need for enhancing the assistance and support for capacity building in developing and least developed members. Because China has not yet obtained the ability to implement some of the trade facilitation measures, not bearing enough capacity to undertake all the obligations stipulated in TFA, China has made corresponding reservations to the provisions of TFA, and identified these reservations as category B commitment obligations.
Meanwhile, paragraph 2 of Article 13 in TFA stipulates that technical support and capacity building assistance should be provided to developing and least developed members for a period of time related to their capacities. A member does not need to carry out the obligation if it lacks the necessary capability until it has the capability associated with the obligation. If a developing or least developed member is able to demonstrate that it has not acquired capacity for enforcement, it may apply to the Committee for an extension of the transitional period until such time as it has acquired such capacity. As further elaborated in footnote 16 of TFA, capacity building assistance and support may take the form of technology, finance or any other forms of assistance agreed upon by the Parties. When joining TFA as a developing member, China may make use of relevant provisions on transitional period and capacity building assistance system of TFA to obtain corresponding effective transitional period and capacity building assistance in light of the actual situation of China’s capacity, which will bring opportunities for China’s trade facilitation development. TFA will contribute to the trade development of developing members of the WTO, which may increase the volume of their exports by 20 per cent to enter more than one third of foreign markets.[23] On average, the costs of trade facilitation reforms are lower than some other initiatives such as customs modernization and transport infrastructure upgrading. [24]
It can be seen that the implementation of TFA will bring huge benefits to developing members. As a developing member, China’s implementation of TFA will undoubtedly create new opportunities for China. China’s level of trade facilitation will be further enhanced, and the port comprehensive governance system will become more modernized. At the same time, TFA will improve the trade facilitation environment of other countries and regions, thereby effectively reducing barriers and obstacles to China’s export trade.[25] China has many deficiencies in customs trade facilitation. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on further enhancing transparency and simplifying customs procedures, promoting customs cooperation, establishing a single window and improving relevant legal systems, so as to strive to be consistent with the trade facilitation measures specified by TFA. In summary, China should give full play to the advantages of its developing members, make effective use of the transitional period provisions and the capacity building assistance system in TFA, and carry out corresponding reform and improvement of customs trade facilitation to promote the development process of China’s trade facilitation, thus seizing the development opportunities brought by TFA to China.
IV. Conclusion
In order to solve the contradictions in legislation, TFA has made a lot of arrangements. On the one hand, TFA adheres to the basic objective of trade freedom and proposes the main measures of trade facilitation, which is to shift from traditional tariff reduction to new free trade areas; on the other hand, TFA proposes some exception provisions, especially new differential treatment model. For the whole arrangement of TFA, the differential treatment for developing members is the most important, and it is the key to solving the contradictions. China joined the WTO as a developing member in 2001. With the rapid development of China’s economy after entering the WTO, China’s status in the WTO is controversial at present. In the mean time, China’s participation in TFA is very special. On the one hand, China is quite different from developed countries in the level of trade facilitation, but China assumes many obligations similar to those of developed countries; on the other hand, China assumes the obligations of developing members under TFA, but it is unable to undertake all the requirements of trade facilitation at present due to its insufficient implementation capacity. Although China assumes a lot of obligations in TFA, TFA has also brought great opportunities for China’s development.[26] China shall give play to the advantages of developing members, and effectively promote the development and improvement of its trade facilitation by making use of the provisions on the transitional period and the capacity building assistance system in TFA.
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